NON-PUBLIC?: N
ACCESSION #: 8806130025
LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

FACILITY NAME: Fermi 2 PAGE: 1 of 3

DOCKET NUMBER: 05000341

TITLE: A Manual Reactor Scram was Initiated When Division I Offsite Power was Interrupted
EVENT DATE: 05/07/88 LER #: 88-019-01 REPORT DATE: 06/06/88

OPERATING MODE: 2 POWER LEVEL: 003

THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR SECTION
50.73(a)(2)(iv)

LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER:
NAME: Patricia Anthony, Compliance Engineer
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SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED: No

ABSTRACT: On May 7, 1988 at 0138 hours, offsite power to Division 1 was interrupted. Control Rod Drive pump A tripped on loss of power. Since reactor power was less than 900 psig, a manual scram was initiated by placing the mode switch in the shutdown position as required by Technical Specifications. All actuations and isolation occurred as expected.

Investigation determined a raccoon climbing the System Service Transformer #1 had caused a ground fault on the "Z" phase. The transformer was inspected, cleaned and repaired prior to being returned to service. Inspection of the mat around the transformer revealed that the grade had settled below the fence allowing a path for the raccoon to enter. Gravel was brought in to bring the grade above the fence line.

(End of Abstract)

Initial Conditions:

Operational Condition: 2 (Startup)
Reactor Power: 3.5 percent
Reactor Temperature: 503 degrees Fahrenheit
Reactor Pressure: 710 psig

Description of Event:

On May 7, 1988, Division I Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) (EK) 12 was running as part of its monthly surveillance. At 0138 hours, offsite power from the 120 kilovolt (kv) Bus 101 (BU) (EA) to Division 1 was interrupted. The Division 1 EDG 11 received an automatic start signal and both Division I EDGs loaded as expected. The 120 kv fed transformers, SS64 and SS66, (XFMR) were lost as a result of the power interruption. Control Rod Drive (AA) pump A (P) tripped on loss of transformer SS64. Since reactor pressure was less than 900 psig, a manual scram was initiated by placing the mode switch to shutdown in accordance with Technical Specification Action Statement 3.1.3.5.a.2.a.

All actuations and isolations occurred as expected. The following engineered safety features (JE) were actuated:

1. Emergency Diesel Generators 11 and 12 (12 was already running) started and automatically load sequenced their emergency loads.

2. The Control Center Heating Ventilation and Air Conditioning System (VI) shifted into the recirculation mode. Secondary containment isolated.

3. Division 1 Standby Gas Treatment System (BH) automatically started.

4. Division 1 Control Air Compressor (COMP) automatically started.

5. Division 1 Emergency Equipment Cooling Water System (CC) automatically started.

The following primary containment automatic isolations (JM) occurred:

1. Torus Water Management System (BT) (Group 12),

2. Primary Containment Monitoring System (IK) (Group 17),

3. Reactor Recirculation Seal Purge (AD) (Group 17),

4. Drywell Pneumatics (Group 18) and

5. Reactor Water Cleanup System - inboard (CE) (Group 10).

Cause of Event:

Investigation into the event was initiated and outside rounds operator discovered a raccoon on the 120 kv mat. The raccoon had apparently been climbing on System Service Transformer #1 (XFMR) and caused a fault on the "Z" phase. The transformer was later inspected, cleaned, and a small pinhole on the insulator was repaired.

Analysis of Event:

The system actuation and isolations associated with this event were as expected for a loss of Division 1 offsite power. The loss of one division of offsite power is an analyzed condition and the associated isolations and actuations were all within the design of the various systems. Therefore, the safety significance of this event is minimal.

Corrective Actions:

The 120 kv mat was inspected for any evidence of animal residency on the mat as well as places for intrusion onto the mat. No nesting areas were found; however, there were areas where the gravel grade had settled well below the fence line. These areas were filled in to minimize easy ingress of animals onto the mat.

Previous Similar Occurrences:

This is the first Licensee Event Report describing a loss of offsite power event due to animal intrusion into energized offsite power sources.

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June 6, 1988
NRC-88-0132

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Attention: Document Control Desk
Washington, D.C. 20555

Reference: Fermi 2
NRC Docket No. 50-341
Facility Operating License No. NPF-43

Subject: Licensee Event Report (LER) No. 88-019-00

Please find enclosed LER No. 88-019-00, dated June 6, 1988, for a reportable event that occurred on May 7, 1988. A copy of this LER is also being sent to the Regional Administrator, USNRC Region III.

If you have any questions, please contact Patricia Anthony at (313) 586-1617.

Sincerely,
/s/

Enclosure: NRC Forms 366, 366A

cc: A. B. Davis
J. R. Eckert
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Wayne County Emergency
Management Division

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